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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(1)

Nature of the Case:
Chance M. LeBow (Claimant) worked for Right Now, Inc., (Employer) for just one day.

Even though he enjoyed the work and agreed to work his next on-call assignment, Claimant did
not to show up for his next assignment Tr. p. 24, Ll. 22-24; p. 25, Ll. 5-9. After working just
one day for Employer, Claimant filed a continued claim report with the Idaho Department of
Labor (Department) in order to continue receiving unemployment benefits. l Exhibit 11; Tr. p.
26. L. 25; p. 27, Ll. 1-4. Less than a week after working that one day, Claimant answered "No"
when asked by the Department in his continued claim report, "Did you work during the week
claimed?" Exhibits 11 and 13, p. 3; Tr. p. 26, Ll. 21-25, p. 27, Ll. 1-7.
The Industrial Commission (Commission) concluded Claimant voluntarily quit without
good cause and willfully failed to report his work and earnings. R. pp. 19-32. The Commission
also concluded Claimant was statutorily ineligible for a waiver of the requirement to repay
benefits and was liable for a 25% civil penalty.

R. pp. 19-32.

Claimant appeals the

Commission's Decision and Order to this Court.
(2)

Course of the Proceedings Below:
On January 31, 2013, the Department received a "New Hire Verification" report from

Employer indicating Employer had hired Claimant. According to the report, Claimant worked
for Employer on December 3, 2012, and received wages. Exhibit 9, p. 1. Department workforce

I IDAPA 09.01.30.550 requires each claimant to report weekly for benefits as directed. An application for benefits
or waiting week credit for a specific compensable week is called a continued claim. IDAPA 09.01.30.0 I 0.12.
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consultant semor Leyla Barthlome found the discrepancy between the work and eammgs
Employer reported and the work and earnings Claimant reported for the week ending December
8,2012? Exhibits 12 and 13; Tf, p. 5, Ll. 23-25; p. 6, Ll. 1-6. In February 2013, Barthlome
contacted Claimant and asked him to explain the discrepancy. Exhibits 12 and 13.
As a result of her investigation, Barthlome issued an eligibility determination on
February 25, 2013, finding Claimant was not eligible for benefits because he failed to accept
available suitable work. Exhibit 14. She also issued a second eligibility determination finding
Claimant willfully made false statements or failed to report material facts on his claim in order to
receive unemployment benefits. Exhibit 15. The next day, the Department determined Claimant
had been overpaid $1,372.00, which included $343.00 he received for the week ending
December 8, 2012; $343.00 he received for the week ending December 15, 2012; $343.00 he
received for the week ending December 22, 2012; and $343.00 he received for the week ending
December 29, 2012. Exhibits 17 and 20. Claimant filed a request for an appeals hearing with
the Department. Exhibit 19.
On March 12, 2013, the Department mailed a Notice of Telephone Hearing to the parties
setting a hearing for March 27, 2013. Exhibit 1. The Notice told the parties a Department
appeals examiner would consider the following issues: whether Claimant's unemployment was
due to his failure without good cause to apply for available suitable work or to accept suitable
work when offered in violation ofIdaho Code §§ 72-1366(6) and (7); whether Claimant willfully
made a false statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain

2

For unemployment benefit purposes a benefit week begins with Sunday and ends on Saturday. Benefit weeks are
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unemployment insurance benefits in violation of Idaho Code § 72-1366(12): whether Claimant
was subject to a civil penalty as a result of making a false statement or failing to report a material
fact in violation of to Idaho Code § 72-1369(2); and if Claimant received benefits he was not
entitled to receive, whether the requirement to repay those benefits would be waived pursuant to
Idaho Code § 72-1369(5). Exhibit 1. The Department's Appeals Bureau included Exhibits 1
through 21 with the notice.
On March 27, 2013, a Department appeals examiner conducted a hearing.

Claimant,

Barthlome and Employer's representatives Brian Redford and Stephanie Glasson pmiicipated in
the hearing. The appeals examiner issued a decision on March 27, 2013. R. pp. 1-5. In his
decision, the appeals examiner affirmed the determination finding Claimant willfully failed to
report a material fact in order to obtain unemployment benefits. R. pp. 1-5. He also imposed a
25% penalty and denied Claimant a waiver of the requirement to repay benefits to the
Department. R. pp. 1-5. However, rather than address the issue of whether Claimant failed to
accept suitable work listed in the notice the parties received, the appeals examiner concluded
Claimant voluntarily quit without good cause in violation of Idaho Code § 72-1366(5). R. pp. 15. The appeals examiner modified this issue unilaterally. There is no evidence in the record the
parties received any notice of this issue prior to the hearing or waived the notice requirement at
the hearing.
On April 8, 2013, Claimant filed a timely appeal of the decision to the Commission. R.
pp. 6-11. The Commission issued its Decision and Order on June 10, 2013, based on a de novo

referred to by their week ending date.
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review of the record that included the exhibits admitted by the appeals examiner at the hearing
and an audio recording of the hearing.

Idaho Code § 72-1368(7); R. pp. 19-32.

The

Commission concluded Claimant received due process, denied Claimant a new hearing to
consider the additional evidence he offered with his appeal, and affirmed the appeals examiner's
decision. R. pp. 19-32. On July 19, 2010, Claimant filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court. R.
pp. 33-35.
(3)

Statement of Facts:
Claimant filed his first claim for unemployment benefits on September 27, 2010. Exhibit

7, p. l. On November 20, 2012, Claimant filed his second claim for unemployment benefits
after Commercial Tire, Inc., laid him off on November 19, 201l. Exhibit 7, pp. 1-2. At that
time, his maximum weekly benefit amount was $343.00. Exhibit 11.
Six days after filing his second claim for benefits, Claimant applied for a job with
Employer. Tr. p. 16, Ll. 16-18. Employer's install manager, Allen MacKenzie, interviewed
Claimant and offered him a position in Employer's apprenticeship program. Tr. p. 16, Ll. 16-19.
Claimant accepted the position. Tr. p. 29, Ll. 18-23. Claimant would start with minimal to no
experience and work through a four year process to become a journeyman Heating Ventilation
Air Conditioning (HV AC) installer. Tr. p. 29, LL 18-25; p. 30, Ll. 1-5. Claimant acknowledged
he was pretty sure MacKenzie explained that the work would be on-calL Tr. p. 30, Ll. 20-25.
Claimant started work on December 3,2012, for $8.00 an hour. Exhibit 9; Tr. p. 11, Ll.
8-11; p. 16, Ll. 19-21; p. 18, Ll. 14-16; p. 20, L. 16. Claimant worked for 11 hours that day and
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earned $88.00. Exhibit 9, p, 1; Tr. p. 11, Ll. 19-21. Employer did not call with an assignment
for Claimant the following day, Tr. p. 20, Ll. 16-25.
While waiting for Employer to call him with another assignment, Claimant called the
Department to discuss his unemployment insurance options.

Tr. p. 22, LL 12-13. Although

Claimant acknowledged he enjoyed working for Employer that one day, Claimant told the
Department staff member who answered the phone that he did not think the job he had would
work out because he did not have any training in HV AC, it was a long shot job, it would take
him months to learn this stuff and it was really intense, Tr. p. 22, Ll. 12-22. He asked the staff
member, "what are my options, can I quit this job and look for another job?" Tr. p. 22, Ll. 2425. The staff member told Claimant he could not quit his job until he found another job. Tr. p.
22, L 25; p. 23, Ll. 1-3.
Claimant began looking for another job. Tr. p. 23, Ll. 3-4. Claimant contacted a former
employer, Pizza Hut. Tr. p. 23, Ll. 7-10; p. 24, Ll. 6-7. Pizza Hut offered him ajob as a driver,
but the work would not begin until December 19,2012. Tr. p. 23, Ll. 7-15,25; p. 24, Ll. 1-7; p.
25, Ll. 11-13. Pizza Hut would only guarantee Claimant 10-25 hours a week. Exhibit 19, p. 1.
Claimant went to Employer's office and spoke with MacKenzie on December 5, 2012,
and MacKenzie told him there might be an assignment for him the next day. Tr. p. 21, Ll. 11-21.
The next morning, MacKenzie called and asked Claimant to take the assignment. Tr. p. 22, Ll.
1-7. Claimant accepted the assignment, but then did not report for work, Exhibit 12, p. 3; Tr. p.
23, Ll. 14-17. Claimant felt the assignment was not worth his time and he had begun the hiring
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process for another job. Exhibit 12; Tr. p. 23, Ll. 14-17. Claimant did not discuss any of his
concerns about the assignment with Employer. Tr. p. 16, L. 25; p. 17, LI. 1-4.
When Claimant filed his second claim for unemployment benefits on November 20,
2012, he viewed a slide presentation.

Exhibit 13, p. 3; Tr. p. 7, Ll. 19-21.

In the slide

presentation the Department told Claimant he must file a continued claim report at the end of
each week to receive benefits and if he did not file one he would not receive a payment or
waiting week credit. Exhibit 4, p. 9. Another slide informed Claimant that each week he would
be asked about his ability to work, his availability for work, his work seeking activities and
whether he worked during the week. Exhibit 4, p. 7.
Other slides informed Claimant that he would be receiving a Claimant Benefit Rights and
Responsibilities pamphlet, he would be held responsible for knowing the information in the
pamphlet and if he had questions after reviewing the pamphlet to contact the Department.
Exhibit 4, pp. 1 and 17. The pamphlet warned Claimant that he must report his earnings in the
week he worked and not the week he was paid and to report all earnings from all employers
before deductions. Exhibit 2B, p. 4. The pamphlet also gave Claimant a list of things that could
stop or deny him benefits. Exhibit 2B, p. 17. Among the items listed were "quitting a job" and
"missing or refusing suitable work." Exhibit 2B, p. 17.
Another slide told Claimant that if he worked during a week for which he was claiming
benefits he must report that he worked whether or not he earned wages. Exhibit 4, p. 12. The
same slide also told Claimant he must report. his gross wages before deductions. Exhibit 4, p. 12:
Tr. p. 7, LI. 23-25. A slide warned Claimant that if he failed to disclose information in order to
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get benefits he risked felony prosecution in addition to repayment of the overpayment, payment
of interest and penalties, and a 52 week disqualification. Exhibit 4, p. 14. Finally, a slide gave
him the following examples of what the Department considered fraud. Specifically this slide
warned:

Not reporting that you worked during a week even if you are not going to
receive pay for the work performed. You work and tell us you didn't work ...
that's fraud!
You refuse work. Offered ajob but refuse it and don't tell us that's fraud!
Exhibit 4, p. 15; Tr. p. 8, Ll. 2-9 (Emphasis original).
On December 9, 2012, Claimant filed a continued claim report for the week ending
December 8, 2012. Exhibits 11 and 13, p. 3, Tr. p. 26, Ll. 21-25; p. 27 L. l. In that claim report,
Claimant answered "No" to the question, "Did you refuse or miss available work?" Exhibit 5,
pp. 4 and 6 and Exhibit 11. He also answered "No" to the question "Did you work for any
employers during the week claimed, include National Guard or Reserve?" Exhibit 5, pp. 4 and
6; Tr. p. 27, Ll. 1-4. Claimant acknowledged that he knew he had to report when he worked.
Exhibit 13, p. 3.

When Claimant did not report he worked, he avoided the requirement to

provide his earnings and he avoided answering several follow-up questions. Exhibits 5, pp. 4-6
and 11; Tr. p. 26, L. 25; p. 27, Ll. 1-7. One of the follow-up questions Claimant avoided was,
"Did you quit any job during the week?" Exhibit 5, p. 4.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.
Did Claimant receive a fair hearing?

II.
Is there substantial and competent evidence

lil

the record to support the Industrial

Commission's findings and conclusion that Claimant willfully made false statements or willfully
failed to report materials fact in order to obtain unemployment benefits?

III.
Is there substantial and competent evidence

lil

the record to support the Industrial

Commission's findings and conclusion Claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits
because he voluntarily quit without good cause?
IV.
Is Claimant, as a matter of law, not eligible for a waiver and subject to a 25% civil
penalty as a result of his false statement or failure to report a material fact?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In appeals from decisions of the Industrial Commission, the Court's review is limited to
questions of law. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9; Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 434, 974
P.2d 78, 80 (1999). This Court does not reweigh the evidence or consider whether it would have
reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Current v. Haddans Fencing, [nc.,
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152 Idaho 10, 13,266 P.3d 485,488 (2011). While conflicting evidence may exist in the record,
the Court will not disturb the Commission's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.

Ginther v Boise Cascade Corporation, 150 Idaho 143,244 P.3d 1229, 1233 (2010). The factual
findings of the Commission will be upheld provided they are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Uhf v. Ballard Medical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265,
1269 (2003). "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion." Id. "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof,
but less than a preponderance." Painter v. Potlach Corporation, 138 Idaho 309, 312, 63 P.2d 435,
438 (2003), citing Zapata v. JR. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999).
It is for the Commission to determine the credit and weight to be given to the testimony

admitted. Bullard v. Sun Valley Aviation, Inc., 128 Idaho 430, 432,914 P.2d 564, 566 (1996).
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, the Court views all facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the party who prevailed before the Commission. Current, 152 Idaho at 13,266
P.3d at 488.
ARGUMENT
I.

Claimant received a fair hearing.
In his appeal to the Industrial Commission and in his Appeal to this Court Claimant
contends he did not receive a fair hearing.

R. pp. 7 and 33.

Federal law requires the

"[o]pportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals whose claims for
unemployment compensation are denied .... " 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3). This Court has held the fair
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hearing requirement is satisfied at the Department appellate level when "a fair and impartial
hearing" is held. Fouste v. DepartmentoJEmployment, 97 Idaho 162, 167,540 P.2d 1341, 1346
(1975).
Claimant did not offer any reason other than incorrect facts to support his claim that he
failed to receive a fair hearing. The Commission concluded Claimant received a fair hearing
because he participated in the hearing and had the opportunity to testify, cross examine witnesses
and provide a closing statement. R. p. 21. The Commission went on to consider whether it
should hold a new hearing because Claimant submitted additional evidence with his appeal. R.
p.21.
Normally, the Commission considers the same record considered by the appeals examiner
unless it appears to the Commission that the interests of justice require the consideration of
additional evidence. Flowers v. Shenango Screenprinting, Inc., 150 Idaho 295, 298, 246 PJd
668,671 (2010). The Commission may grant a new hearing or remand the matter to the appeals
examiner. Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). The Commission's decision to permit or exclude evidence
not considered by the appeals examiner is discretionary. Jd.
This Court employs the following three-part test to determine whether the Commission
has abused its discretion: (1) whether the Commission correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, (2) whether the Commission acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available, and (3) whether
the Commission reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
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Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho

Department of Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390,162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007); Flo'wers, 150 Idaho at 299,

246 P.3d at 672.
Here, the Commission specifically acknowledged that it perceived the issue as one of
discretion. R. p. 20. The Commission has the discretion to admit additional evidence, but it is
not required to do so. Flowers, 150 Idaho at 298, 246 P.3d at 671. The Commission's rules
require a party requesting a hearing to provide an explanation of why the proposed additional
evidence was not presented earlier. R.A.P.P. 7(B). Claimant failed to provide an explanation of
why the evidence was not presented earlier.
The Commission noted that Claimant participated in the hearing and had ample
opportunity to present evidence during and after the hearing. The Commission noted he received
instructions that accompanied the Notice of Telephone Hearing. R. p. 21. Those instructions
informed Claimant that he was responsible for insuring all the documents critical to his position
were included in the record. Exhibit 2. The instructions also told him how to add them to the
record. Exhibit 2. Those instructions told Claimant he could ask the appeals examiner to reopen
the hearing if he had additional evidence that was not available at the time of the hearing.
Exhibit 2.
Under the circumstances, the Commission correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion. The Commission acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.

The Commission's decision to deny Claimant a hearing met the

requirements of the test. Flowers, 150 Idaho 299, 246 P.3d at 672.
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However, in limiting its focus to the additional evidence Claimant offered, the
Commission overlooked a due process issue created by the appeals Examiner when he modified
one of the issues he considered in his decision. Claimant received two eligibility determinations.
There is no due process issue with regard to the appeals examiner's review of the determination
finding Claimant willfully made a false statement or failed to report a material fact. Exhibit 15.
Claimant had notice that the appeals examiner would consider this issue. Exhibit 1.
However, as a result of the evidence presented at the hearing, the appeals exammer
substituted the issue of whether Claimant voluntarily quit with good cause, for the issue of
whether Claimant failed to accept available suitable work. R. pp. 1-5 There is no evidence in
the record that the parties had notice the appeals examiner would consider whether Claimant had
good cause to leave his employment under Idaho Code § 72-l366(5). This Court has held an
administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the affected party with fair
notice and provide him with a full opportunity to meet the Issue.

White v. Idaho Forest

Industries, 98 Idaho 784, 785, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977).
In White, an appeals examiner ruled White was eligible for benefits because he was not
discharged for misconduct White, 98 Idaho at 785, 572 P.2d at 888. His employer appealed and
asked the Commission for a hearing. Id. White did not attend the hearing and the Commission
received evidence from White's employer leading it to conclude White was not eligible for
benefits because he failed to accept work when offered. Id. This Court agreed with White that
the notice of hearing he received from the Commission did not put him on notice the
Commission would hear additional evidence on a new issue. White, 98 Idaho at 786,572 P.2d at
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889. The notice White received told him that he need not attend the hearing if he was satisfied
and wanted to rest on the record created below. White, 98 Idaho at 785,572 P.2d at 888.
Here however, the appeals examiner and not the Commission considered a new issue.
This Court has considered a case similar to this case. In Rogers v. Trim House, 99 Idaho 746,
588 P.2d 945 (1979), the appeals examiner considered a new issue without giving Rogers notice.
Rogers, 99 Idaho at 748,588 P.2d at 947.
Rogers, like Claimant here, participated in the hearing before the appeals examiner. Id.
The notice Rogers received before the hearing indicated the appeals examiner would determine
whether he was eligible for benefits based on January 10, 1977, separation from employment.
Rogers participated in the hearing and the evidence presented at the hearing indicated that
Rogers not only quit in January, but had also quit and returned to work one month earlier. Id.
In his decision the appeals examiner considered whether Rogers was eligible for benefits
based on both separations. Id. Rogers had no notice the appeals examiner would consider any
issues related to his earlier separation. Id. This Court concluded it was error for an appeals
examiner to modify the determination to make findings on an issue not properly before the
appeals examiner. Rogers, 99 Idaho at 748, 588 P.2d at 947. However, the Court also concluded
that the question remained as to whether the lack of notice with respect to the earlier separation
was prejudicial error and noted that Rogers had the burden of showing prejudicial error. Rogers,
99 Idaho at 749, 588 Idaho at 948.
Here, as in Rogers, Claimant has not made any showing that he was prejudiced by the
failure of the appeals examiner to give him notice he would determine whether he quit with good
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cause. Rogers, 99 Idaho at 749, 588 P.2d at 948. Claimant had the opportunity to present and
rebut evidence.

Claimant testified that MacKenzie called him on December 6th.

Claimant

testified, "Allen is like I got ajob for you, you want to come in and work and I said sure ... " Tr.
p. 22, Ll. 1-9; p. 23, Ll. 14-17. Claimant accepted the assignment, but failed to show up.
He called a Department staff member while waiting for Employer to call him back and
asked, "what are my options, can I quit this job and look for another job?" Exhibit 13, p. 4; Tr.
p. 22, Ll. 24-25. Claimant argued at the hearing and argues now that he did not fail to accept
suitable work rather he quit with good cause. R. p. 33; Tr. p. 22, 14-25; p. 23, Ll. 14-23; p. 24,
Ll. 20-25; p. 26, Ll. 1-4; p. 31, Ll. 17-24. When Claimant found another job, he abandoned his

job with Employer.

Exhibit 12; Tr. p. 23, Ll. 14-17.

At the hearing Employer maintained

Claimant abandoned the job. Exhibits 9 and 12, p. 2; Tr. p. 13, Ll. 2-4; p. 17, Ll. 1-13. It is clear
throughout the hearing that Claimant thought he quit.
Due process is not a rigidly applied concept, but rather, is a flexible concept calling for
such procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation. Neighbors for a Healthy
Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 (2007). At a minimum,

hearing procedures must provide an opportunity to present and rebut evidence. Id.
Claimant has not demonstrated he suffered any prejudice from the appeals examiner's
failure to provide notice on this issue.

Claimant had the opportunity to present and rebut

evidence presented by the Department and Employer. Claimant argued in his notice of appeal to
the Commission that he was not offered work on December 5, 2012, because he had already
begun working on December 3,2012. R. p. 7. He argued to the Commission that he quit his job.
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R. p. 7. The Commission agreed finding that "[ w ]hile Claimant seems to question the date and
manner that Employer offered him the additional assignment, what is not in dispute is that
Claimant accepted the assignment, but failed to show up for work." R. p. 23. Substantial and
competent evidence indicates that the appeals examiner erred, but that error was harmless.
Claimant's due process rights were not violated and he received a fair hearing.

II.
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial
Commission's findings and conclusion that Claimant willfully made a false
statement or willfully failed to report a material fact in order to obtain
unemplovment benefits.
When filing a claim for benefits, a claimant is required to provide the Department with all
necessary information pertinent to his eligibility.

Idaho Code § §72-1366(1).

In Meyer v.

Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754, 589 P.2d 89 (1979), this Court held that the Department

should be able to assume claimants "are reporting all the information solicited from them fully
and accurately." Meyer, 99 Idaho at 760,589 P.2d at 95.
To promote accurate reporting, Idaho Code § 72-1366(12) makes a claimant ineligible for
benefits and subject to penalties when he makes a willful false statement of a material fact or
willfully fails to report a material fact to the Department in order to obtain benefits. Idaho Code
§§ 72-1366(12) and 72-1369(2).

Pursuant to § 72-1366(12), a claimant is not entitled to

unemployment benefits for a period of fifty-two (52) weeks, he is ineligible for waiting week
credit and he must repay any sums received for any week for which he received waiting week
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credit or benefits as a result of having willfully made a false statement or having willfully failed
to report a material fact. Idaho Code § 72-1366(12).
An allegation that a claimant is ineligible for benefits under Idaho Code § 72-1366(12)
does not rise to the level of an allegation of fraud, but rather is a "lesser willful standard." Cox v.
Hollow Leg Pub, 144 Idaho 154, 159, 158 PJd 930, 935 (2007). Ihe burden of establishing

statutory eligibility in these cases rests with Claimant lvfcNulty v. Sinclair Oil, 152 Idaho 582,
585, 272 P.3d 554, 557 (2012). Claimant must demonstrate that his failure to accurately report
his work and earnings does not render him ineligible under Idaho Code § 72-13 66( 12). Ihe
Commission concluded Claimant did not meet his burden. R. pp. 19-31. It concluded Claimant
made a willful false statement of a material fact in order to obtain benefits when he failed to
report his work and earnings for the week ending December 8, 2012. R. p. 29.
On December 9, 2012, Claimant filed a weekly continued claim report for the week
ending December 8, 2012 in order to receive a $343.00 benefit payment. Exhibit 11, If. p. 26,

LL 21-25; p. 27, L. 1. In that claim report, Claimant answered "No" to the question, "Did you
work for any employers during the week claimed?" Exhibit 5, pp. 4 and 6; If. p. 27, LL 1-7.
Claimant acknowledged that he knew he had to report when he worked.

Exhibit 13, p. 3.

Claimant also acknowledged that he worked and earned $88.00 on December 3, 2012, but on
December 9, 2012, when he filed his continued claim report, Claimant did not report he worked.
Exhibits 11 and 13, p. 4; If. p. 27, Ll. 1-19.
Employer.

Claimant decided not to return to work for

By answering "No" to this question, he avoided follow-up questions about his

earnings and he avoided the follow-up question "Did you quit any job during the week?" Exhibit
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5, pp. 4-6. A truthful answer to this question would have disqualified him for benefits until he
earned 14 times his weekly benefit amount. Idaho Code § 72-1366(14).
The Commission found Claimant's failure to report his work and earnings was material.
R. p. 26. "[A] fact is material if it is relevant to a determination of a claimant's right to benefits.
To be material, the fact need not actually affect the outcome of the eligibility determination."
IDAPA 09.01.04.012.

In McNulty, this Court concluded, "What could be more material in

seeking unemployment benefits than whether the claimant is employed?" McNulty, 152 Idaho at
585,272 P.3d at 557.
As a final step in the inquiry, the Commission determined Claimant's failure to report
was willful. R. p. 27. This Court has adopted an interpretation of the word "willful" that does
not require a demonstration of evil intent on the part of a claimant to reach a conclusion that his
conduct was willful. In A1eyer, this Court defined "willfully" as it applies to this provision of the
Employment Security Law as follows:
[Willfully] implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the
omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate the law, in the sense
of having an evil or corrupt motive or intent. It does imply a conscious wrong,
and may be distinguished from an act maliciously or corruptly done, in that it
does not necessarily imply an evil mind, but is more nearly synonymous with
"intentionally," "designedly," "without lawful excuse," and therefore not
accidental.

Meyer, 99 Idaho at 761,589 P.2d at 96 (quoting, Archboldv. Huntington, 34 Idaho 558,
565,201 P. 1041, 1043, (1921)).
Claimant maintained that he did not repOli his work and earnings because he was too
busy looking for a job; he was not sure Employer would pay him; and then he was not sure he
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would keep the money. Exhibit 13, pp. 3-4; Ir. p. 27, LL 12-19. Claimant also argued that when
he called the Department on December 5, 2012 to ask about quitting his job with Employer he
told the Department he was working for Employer.

Ir. p. 27, Ll. 23-35.

Claimant did not

contact the Department after he was paid and decided to keep the money. Exhibit 13, p. 4; Ir. p.
27, Ll. 20-25; p. 28, LL 1-28. Claimant never reported his earnings.
Despite Claimant's explanation for his conduct, the Commission found his conduct
R. p. 27.

willful.

Citing the pamphlet and the slideshow the Commission found Claimant

received clear and repetitive instructions on the need to report work and earnings and the
consequences for failing to do so. R. pp. 27-28. When a claimant knows what information the
Department is soliciting, but nevertheless deliberately chooses to respond without clarification,
this Court has held it ordinarily supports a finding of willful falsehood or concealment. Cox v.

Hollow Leg Pub, 144 Idaho 154, 158, 158 P.3d 930,934 (2007). Ihis Court has also affirmed
the Commission's determination that a claimant willfully failed to report his earnings based on
evidence that a claimant was aware of the regulations regarding unemployment insurance.

Gaehring

v.

Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 118, 119, 594 P.2d 628, 629 (1979).

Claimant was clearly aware of the regulations.

When Barthlome asked him about his

understanding of the reporting requirements, he responded "to report when I work." Exhibit 3, p.
3.
Claimant's conduct meets this Court's definition of willful.

A preponderance of the

evidence in the record supports the Commission's conclusion that Claimant willfully failed to report
material facts in order to obtain benefits in violation ofIdaho Code § 72-13 66(12).
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III.
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial
Commission's findings and conclusion Claimant was ineligible for unemployment
benefits because he voluntarily quit without good cause.
When employment ends voluntarily, the burden is on the Claimant to demonstrate his
departure was for good cause. Ewins v, Allied Security, 138 Idaho 343, 347, 63 P.3d 469, 473
(2003); Idaho Code § 72-1366(5). Claimant has the burden of establishing good cause by a
preponderance of the evidence for failing to show up for work, Teevan v. Office of Attorney

General, 130 Idaho 79, 82,936 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1997). "A preponderance of the evidence
means that when weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of
fact relies is more probably true than not." Oxley v, Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc" 139 Idaho
476,80 P.3d 1077, 1082 (2003). The question of whether Claimant had good cause to quit is a
factual one determined by the Commission on a case by case basis. Ewins, 138 Idaho at 347, 63
P,3d at 473,
To constitute good cause, the circumstances that compel the decision to leave
employment must be real, not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical.
There must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous circumstances, Ewins,
138 Idaho at 347, 63 P,3d at 473. "Good cause is determined by a reasonable person standard:
whether a reasonable person would consider the circumstances that prompted the claimant to
leave work to be real, substantial, and compelling." Teevan, 130 Idaho at 82, 936 P.2d at 1324,
In addition, pursuant to IDAPA 09,01.30.450.02, Claimant must also prove his reasons for
leaving employment arose from his working conditions, job tasks, or employment agreement.
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While the date he accepted a second assignment from Employer

IS

in dispute, there is no

dispute Claimant accepted the assignment, but opted not to go because he felt it was just not
going to work out. Tr. p. 23, LI. 20-21. At the hearing, Claimant acknowledged that he took the
job with Employer knowing it would be on-call employment.

Tr. p. 30, LI. 20-25.

The

Commission noted that he continued working for Employer until he found another job. R. p. 24.
He testified that he decided not to return to work because he had "a pretty good feeling" he
would be hired by Pizza Hut. Tf. p. 25, Ll. 9-12. The Commission concluded that leaving his
work to take a job at Pizza Hut was purely personal. R. p. 24.
IDAPA 09.01.30.450.06 provides "a claimant who quits a temporary job for a permanent
job or who quits part-time employment for employment with an increase in the number of hours
of work shall be deemed to have quit work with good cause connected with employment."
Claimant did not meet this rule's exception.

Claimant left one part-time permanent job for

another part-time permanent job. Exhibit 19, p. 1; Tr. p. 29, Ll. 18-25; p. 30, Ll. 1-5. The
Commission noted the job Claimant had with Employer was not full time, but as the Commission
found there is no evidence it was not permanent. R. 24. Claimant acknowledged that his job
with Pizza Hut "only guaranteed 10-25 hours a week." Again there was no evidence it was not
permanent. Exhibit 19, p. 1. Nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest the hours the
Pizza Hut job offered would constitute an increase when compared to the number of hours
offered by Employer.
In order to demonstrate good cause an employee must explore all viable options before
making the decision to quit. Ewins, 138 Idaho at 348, 63, P.3d at 474, Claimant testified that in
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addition to not wanting to work on-call work, he felt he could not handle the job and it was
"messing" with his anxiety. Ir. p. 31, L1. 15-17. Claimant never raised any of these concerns
with Employer. Mr. Redford, Employer's general manager, testified that there was no indication
Claimant had any issue or problem with the work he was doing for Employer. Ir. p. 16, L. 25; p.
17, L1. 1-4.
As the Commission noted, the primary policy behind of the Employment Security Act is
to prevent involuntary unemployment and not to encourage the upgrading of employment.

Ewins, 138 Idaho at 348,63 P.3d at 474; see also, Garner v. Horkley Oil, 123 Idaho 831, 834,
853 P.2d 576, 579 (1993). Given that policy, the Commission's conclusion that Claimant quit
without good cause is supported by substantial and competent evidence.

IV.
As a matter of law Claimant is not eligible for a waiver and subject to a 25% civil
penalty as a result of his false statement or failure to report a material fact.
Under Idaho's Employment Security Law, an overpayment occurs when a claimant
receives benefits to which he is not entitled. Idaho Code §72-1369(l). Overpayments must be
repaid to the Department. Idaho Code §72-1369(1). Claimant received benefits the Department
determined were overpaid week ending December 8, 2012, the week ending December 15,2012,
the week ending December 22, 2012, and the week ending December 29, 2012. Exhibit 20. Ihe
Department issued a Determination of Overpayment informing Claimant he had to repay the
$1,372.00 in benefits he received. Exhibit 17. Claimant appealed that Determination. Exhibit
19.
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The Appeals Examiner concluded Claimant was ineligible for benefits because he quit
without good cause and made a willful false statement in order to receive benefits. R. pp. 1-5.
The Commission affirmed the appeals examiner's decision on those issues.

R. pp. 19-31.

Substantial and competent evidence supports those conclusions. Both the appeals examiner and
the Commission addressed the waiver issue with regard to the week ending December 8, 2012,
but both overlooked the portion of the overpayment created by the payments Claimant received
for the week ending December 15,2012, through the week ending December 29,2012. Because
substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's conclusion that Claimant
willfully made false statements or failed to report material facts, Claimant was also ineligible for
benefits for the week ending December 15,2012, through the week ending December 29,2012,
as well as the week ending December 8, 2012, as a matter oflaw.
When a claimant quits without good cause or fails to accept suitable work when offered,
he is ineligible for benefits until he works and receives wages in the amount of at least fourteen
times his weekly benefit amount. Idaho Code § 72-1366( 14). Had Claimant been truthful when
he filed his continued claim report for the week ending December 8, 2012, he would not have
been eligible for benefits he received for the week ending December 8, 2012, because he failed
to report his work, earnings and that he quit his job. Idaho Code § 72-1366(5). In addition,
Claimant would not have been eligible for benefits after the week ending December 8, 2012,
until he earned 14 times his weekly benefit amount or $4,802.00. The only reason Claimant
continued receiving benefits for the weeks following December 8, 2012, is solely because
Claimant failed to report that he worked and quit on the continued claim report he filed with the
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Department on December 9,2012. He received benefits those weeks as a result of his willful
false statements in violation of §72-1366(l2).
While the Decision to grant a waiver is discretionary, that discretion is limited. Idaho
Code §72-1369(5). To be eligible for a waiver, the overpayment sought to be waived must be
one "other than one resulting from a false statement, misrepresentation, or failure to report a
material fact" Idaho Code § 72-1369(5). Because substantial and competent evidence supports
the finding that Claimant made false statements neither the Department, the appeals examiner,
nor the Commission have the discretion to waive any part of the overpayment created as a result
of those false statements or relieve penalty imposed pursuant to § 72-1369(2). Idaho Code §721369(5). As a matter of law Claimant is not eligible for a waiver.

CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence in the record support the Industrial Commission's
findings and conclusions that Claimant received a fair hearing.

Substantial and competent

evidence also support the Commission's denial of a new hearing and its conclusion that Claimant
was ineligible for benefits because he voluntarily quit without good cause and willfully failed to
report material facts while claiming unemployment insurance benefits. The Department asks the
Court to affirm the Commission's Decision on those issues.
The Department also asks this Court find as a matter of law that because Claimant was
not eligible for a waiver of the requirement to repay benefits for the week ending December 8,
2012, he was also not eligible for benefits the weeks ending December 15, 2012, through the
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week ending December 29, 2012, or in the alternative to remand the matter back solely for the
Commission to consider this issue.
Respectfully submitted,

Deputy Atto ey eneral
Idaho Department of Labor
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